Li's scheme and presented a modified scheme to remove its security pitfalls. This paper presents an improved scheme which is secure against Chan-Cheng and all the extended attacks.
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Introduction: Remote user password based authentication scheme, proposed by Lamport [14] in 1981, is a way to authenticate the remote user over an insecure channel. In Lamport's scheme, the AS stores a password table at the server to check the validity of the login request made by the user. However, high hash overhead and the necessity for password resetting decrease the suitability and practical ability of Lamport's scheme. Since then, many similar schemes [18] [19] [20] have been proposed. They all have a common feature: a verification password table should be securely stored in the AS. Actually, this property is a 2 disadvantage for the security point of view. Unfortunately, the AS will be partially or totally braked/affected, if the password table is stolen /removed /modified by an antagonist/adversary.
Password authentication schemes with smart cards have a long history in the remote user authentication environment. So far different types of password authentication schemes with smarts cards [2] - [3] - [4] - [5] - [9] - [10] - [11] [12] [13] - [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] - [23] have been proposed. In 2000, Hwang and Li [16] proposed a new remote user authentication scheme using smart cards, which was based on ElGamal cryptosystem [22] . This scheme does not maintain the password table to check the validity of the login request. Also, it can withstand messagereplaying attack. Chan and Cheng [7] pointed out the security weaknesses of Hwang and Li's Scheme and show that a legitimate user can easily create a valid pair of (ID , PW ) without knowing the secret key x s of the authentication server.
In 2003, Shen-Lin-Hwang [11] discussed a different attack on the Hwang-Li's scheme and they also proposed a modified scheme to remove the security pitfalls of Hwang-Li's scheme. In the same year, Chang and Hwang [1] explained the practical problems of the Chan -Cheng's attack on the Hwang-Li's scheme. Further, Leung -Cheng, -Fong and Chen [12] pointed out that the Shen-Lin-Hwang's scheme is still vulnerable to the attack proposed by Chan and Cheng.
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Contributions: This paper presents an improved remote user authentication with smart cards. The improved scheme is secure against Chan -Cheng, ChanHwang and Shen-Lin-Hwang's extended attacks.
Organization: Section 2 reviews the Hwang -Li's scheme. Section 3 describes the cryptanalysis of Hwang -Li's scheme. Section 4 reviews the Shen-LinHwang's scheme. Section 5 describes the security pitfall in the Shen-LinHwang's scheme. An improved remote user authentication with smart card is proposed in section 6. Section 7 discusses the security of the improved scheme.
Finally, comes to a conclusion in the section 8.
Notations:
The notations used through out in this paper can be summarized as follows:
U denotes the remote user.
ID denotes the identity of the remote user U.
PW denotes the password corresponding to the registered identity ID.
AS denotes the authentication server. µ denotes a random number generated by the AS at the time of registration of the user U.
REVIEW OF THE HWANG-LI'S SCHEME: There are three phases in the Hwang-Li's scheme: the registration phase, login phase and the authentication phase. In the registration phase, the user U sends a request to the AS for the registration. The AS will issue a smart card and a password to every legal user through a secure channel. In the login Phase, when the user U wants to access the AS, she/he inserts her/his smart card to the smart card reader and then keys the identity and the password to access services. In the authentication phase, the AS checks the validity of the login request.
Registration Phase: A user U submits her/his ID to the AS. AS computes the password PW for the user U, as, PW = ID x s mod p, where, x s is a secret key maintained by the AS and p is a large prime number. AS provides a password PW and a smart card to the user U through a secure channel. The smart card contains the public parameters (f, p), where f a one-way function.
Login Phase: User U attaches her/his smart card to the smart card reader and keys ID and PW. The smart card will perform the following operations:
Generate a random number r.
Compute C 1 = ID r mod p.
where T is the current date and time of the smart card reader.
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Compute M = ID t mod p.
Authentication Phase: Assume AS receives the message C at time T c , where T c is the current date and time at AS. Then the AS takes the following action:
Check the format of ID. If the identity format is not correct, then AS will rejects this login request.
Check, whether T c -T ≤ ∆ T, where ∆ T is the legal time interval due to transmission delay, if not, then rejects the login request C.
Otherwise, the login request will be rejected. the corresponding password for a known arbitrary valid identity, but once the valid identity is generated, its corresponding password will be obtained easily.
Cryptanalysis of the
Shen, Lin and Hwang's scheme: Shen-Lin-Hwang [11] proposed a modified remote user authentication scheme to solve the security pitfall of the Hwang-Li's scheme. Shen-Lin-Hwang's scheme uses the concept of hiding the identity to prevent the masquerading attack. They modified the registration phase, now a shadow identity SID will be issued to the legal user. This modified in the registration phase is described below.
Modified Registration Phase:
A user U submits her/his identity string J to the AS for the registration. The string J contains the name, address, unique number etc.
This information in the string J is unique for every user. Then the AS computes a pair (SID, PW) for the user U after the identity J is identified. The pair (SID, PW)
is computed as SID = Red (J) and PW = (SID) x s mod p, where, Red (.) is a shadow identity of device which is only maintained in the remote server and SID is the shadow identity of the user U. Furthermore, the AS distributes the smart card and (SID, PW) to the user U in a secure way. The smart card contains the public parameters (f, p). In this scheme, the message sent to the AS now contains (SID, C 1 , C 2 , T). Because J i specially formatted, the evil user cannot compute new identity string J i via SID i . to login the AS. If SID A is a primitive root of Zp, then all the valid identities and their corresponding password can be generated easily. Since, Chan -Cheng's attack is one case of this attack so it also works well.
Cryptanalysis of the Shen, Lin and
An Improved Scheme: This section presents an improved remote user authentication scheme to remove the security pitfalls of the original scheme:
Hwang -Li's scheme. This improved scheme overcomes the security flaws of Hwang -Li's scheme, which are described in the previous sections. The improved scheme has four phases: initial phase, registration phase, login phase and verification phase. These phases are described below.
Initial Phase: First, the insider at AS initialized the same public and secret parameters, as in Hwang -Li's scheme.
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Registration Phase: For our requirement, we have modified the registration phase of Hwang and Li's scheme. Assume that this phase is executed over a secure channel. The following steps are involved in this phase.
Step R1. U AS: J. The string J contains the name of the user U, address, identity ID and a unique identification number etc, which are unique for the user U.
Step R2. AS generates a random number µ and then computes m = f (ID ⊕ µ) mod p and the password PW for the user U, as,
Step R3. AS U: a smart card containing the public parameters (f, p) and a pair (ID µ, PW) to the user U.
After the registration, the identity ID of the user has two parts: ID and µ. The second part µ is induced by the AS after registration.
Login Phase: Whenever, the user U wants to gain the access right on the AS, then the following steps are involved for the proper execution of this phase.
Step L1. U attaches her/his smart card to the smart card reader at any time T and keys her/his identity ID µ and the corresponding PW.
Step L2. The smart card of the user U conducts the following computations:
Compute t = f (T ⊕ PW) mod p -1.
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Compute M = (ID) t mod p.
Step
Verification Phase: Assume that the AS receives the login request L R at time T c .
Then, AS does the following computations to check the validity of the login request L R .
Step V1. Check the specific format of the identity ID µ. If the format of the identity is incorrect, then AS rejects the login request L R .
Step V2. Check, whether T c -T ≤ ∆T, where ∆T is the legal time interval due to transmission delay, if not, then AS rejects the login request L R .
Step V3. Check, if C 2
mod p, then the AS accepts the login request. Otherwise, the login request will be rejected by AS.
Security Analysis of the Improved Scheme:
The above scheme is a modified form of the original scheme: Hwang-Li's scheme. The security analysis has been already discussed and demonstrated in [16] . Therefore, this section will only discuss the enhanced security features of the proposed scheme. 
